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ABSTRACT
1. INTRODUCTION
...
Priss53Washington, DC, November 4, 2001
While it could be argued that all representations are "symbolic", in AI the term is usually
used with respect to symbols that can be comprehended and manipulated by humans.
Neural networks are thus not "symbolic". Examples of "biologically inspired"
representations are neural networks and genetic algorithms.
In several disciplines there is a divide between advocates of formal, "classical" or
symbolic approaches to representation and advocates of biologically inspired, fuzzy or
category-based approaches to representation 15 . In this paper, the first approach will be
referred to as "formal" and the second approach as "associative". The basic units of the
approaches are called "formal concepts" and "associative concepts", respectively. These
terms are used as defined terms in this paper and not in their common sense meanings.
Table 1 contains a summary of their distinctive features, which are explained throughout
this paper. The table is based on our own research and on Sloman (1996) and Blank
(2001).
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Formal concepts, which are similar to "classes" in classification research, are precisely
defined with rigid boundaries. They usually have an extensional aspect, which is a set of
objects they denote, and an intensional aspect, which is a formal definition or set of rules
that can be expressed in formal logic. Formal concepts usually require some kind of
symbolic representation but not all symbols represent formal concepts. Together formal
concepts form a hierarchy, concept lattice or classification system based on the inclusion
relation among formal concepts, which is also called ISA relation in AI and in this paper
and is called subconcept-superconcept relation or broader term/narrower term relation in
other disciplines. Systems of formal concepts are usually modeled or designed based on
theories that humans have about the problem domain and the nature of possible solutions.
In several disciplines there is a divide between advocates of formal, "classical" or
symbolic approaches to representation, which can be expressed using standard formal
logic, and advocates of biologically inspired, fuzzy or category-based approaches to
representation, which can be implemented using fuzzy logic, neural networks,
evolutionary computing and similar techniques. This paper argues that these two
approaches should not be viewed as two mutually exclusive approaches but instead as
two complementary forms of representation which both serve a purpose and can be
combined. This is especially important with respect to formal ontologies, which currently
only use formal, classical representations but which should utilize both approaches.
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Associative concepts can serve as a model of how humans imagine concepts, which are
called "cognitive concepts" is this paper. But other structures, such as emergent structures
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In contrast to formal concepts, associative concepts are fuzzy and without precise
definitions or clear boundaries. Their extensional aspects can be modeled as prototypes,
exemplars or fuzzy sets. Their intensional aspects can be modeled as schemata or family
resemblances. But intensional features are often not known precisely. The only
relationship among associative concepts is association (similarity, contrast, contiguity
etc). Associative concepts do not usually form a strict ISA hierarchy. For example, an
associative concept of "piano" could be subsumed under "musical instrument", "piece of
furniture", or many other concepts depending on context. But each of these represents an
abstraction of content and thus a formal concept. Associative systems are "bottom-up"
because they are trained using examples from which structures emerge.
They thus have a "top-down" nature. Formal systems can be evaluated in regards to
logical correctness and completeness.
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It should be noted that the term "ontology" in this paper is used in its AI or WWW
meaning as defined, for example, by www.ontology.org and not in its original sense as
used in philosophy.
in some systems (see below), can also be modeled as associative concepts. There is some
evidence from studies in selective brain damage (Damasio & Damasio, 1994) that some
clustering or hierarchical organization of cognitive concepts does occur in the brain. For
example, there are patients who lose all there knowledge about specific concept groups,
such as vegetables, but retain all other knowledge. But there is no evidence that cognitive
concepts form rigid ISA hierarchies instead of loose associations.
Priss55Washington, DC, November 4, 2001
On the other hand, Medin (1989, p.1476) states that ~'despite the overwhelming evidence
against the classical view, there is something about it that is intuitively compelling".
People want rigid organization. Patrons do not want to return to a library to discover that
all books have been slightly moved over night because today's fuzzy representation is
slightly different from yesterday's. Furthermore, the formal approach is computationally
easy to implement because computers employ formal logic. While associative concepts in
the form of neural networks have been successfully applied to small scale robotic or
perceptual tasks such as face recognition, applications that combine a multitude of
Both formal and associative approaches have advantages and limitations. Many
arguments against formal concepts are based on psychological evidence (eg. Rosch
(1973» or linguistic evidence (eg. Wittgenstein). It is argued (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999)
that formal concepts are insufficient because human cognition is embodied and situated.
Further evidence against formal approaches is that classification systems are often
unsatisfactory to users (compare Yahoo! with Google) because classification presupposes
precise contexts but designers and users of a system are not usually in the same context.
Associative approaches can avoid that problem by assuming that context itself is an
associative (thus flexible) entity. In AI, more than 15 years of manual labor invested in
the formal ontology16 CYC (2001) have not yielded a universally useful and acceptable
knowledge representation tool - most likely because the tool is formal and not situated or
embodied.
The distinction between formal and associative concepts is similar to but broader than
Sloman's (1996) rule-based and associative forms of reasoning. Sloman's research is
restricted to human cognition whereas the notion of formal and associative concepts can
also be applied to systems. Furthermore, Sloman does not discuss connections such as
emergence (see below). The distinction is also similar but not identical to Jacob's (1991)
distinction between classes and categories. Formal and associative concepts are different
models of representation (a structural distinction) whereas categories and classes tend to
have ontological differences. Formal concepts do not need to be "mutually exclusive"
because that would require a tree hierarchy. In a concept lattice, formal concepts are
precisely defined but can be overlapping. For example, "dog" and "pet" can be precisely
defined within a formal context but they can be overlapping. Whether "pet" is a formal or
associative concept depends on how it is modeled in context. This is in contrast to
Jacob's "categories" and "classes" where "pet" would usually be a category.
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2. FEATURES OF FORMAL AND ASSOCIATIVE APPROACHES
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robotic, perceptual and cognitive tasks are not yet in sight. Even though CYC and similar
formal ontologies are not perfect, they are frequently used in language processing and
comprehension applications (such as on the WWW) because there is no equivalent tool
based on associative concepts available.
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This paper argues that if formal knowledge systems, such as classification schemes and
formal ontologies, are ever to overcome their current shortcomings, they need to
incorporate associative concepts. To achieve that they need to employ emergent
structures (Clark (1997) and see below) and dynamic interactions (see below). This may
not be an easy task. Essentially the problem of integration is equivalent to the gap
between quantum mechanics (an associative system) and classical mechanics (a formal
system), which has been studied since Einstein and is .still unsolved. But there may be
partial solutions, such as Ruiz & Srinivasan's system, that can prove successful and
hopefully superior to contemporary, inflexible classificatory structures.
The features in table 1 are prototypical for formal and associative approaches. That
means that not all approaches or systems necessarily have all the above mentioned
features. Instead the features indicate a tendency because systems have a tendency to
have either formal or associative features; a degree because the features can be gradual or
overlapping; or a viewpoint because a single system can be analyzed from a formal or
associative viewpoint. In the following sections, emergent structures, concept formation
and definition, reasoning mechanisms and the use of symbolic representations are
investigated in more detail. They describe important features of formal and associative
approaches and J;easons why they are so different.
With respect to classification systems and formal ontologies this implies that it is time to
integrate the situated, embodied, contextual and perception-based nature of information
into these systems. Of course, this requires some formal methods or models that describe
how this integration could be achieved. The current dilemma of classification theory is
that all existing classification schemes are based on formal concepts but the theoretical
research in this area (eg. Jacob (1991) and Olson (1999» emphasizes a criticism of the
formal approach. There has been at least one implementation of a system (Ruiz &
Srinivasan, 1999) that represents the nodes of a thesaurus (i.e. a formal structure) as
neural networks (i.e. associative concepts). But this is not the only system that is
conceivable.
So, if both formal and associative approaches have limitations but also show promise, it
seems reasonable to consider combining both into a "multi-level approach". This is not a
just a two-level approach because further levels, such as a linguistic level or a physical
level, might need to be added (see below). Human reasoning does in fact appear to
encompass several of these levels (Sloman, 1996) because humans are both capable of
processing in an association-based mode and employing logical reasoning. Several
cognitive scientists (Sloman (1996), Pinker (1991), and to some degree Clark (1997»
have recently been supporting models that are based on such a combination.
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2.1 Emergent and designed structures
The search engine Google is an example of the effective use of emergent structures.
Clark (1997, p. 110) defines emergence by stating that "a phenomenon is emergent if it is
best understood by attention to the changing values of a collective variable" and
"emergent phenomena ... are thus the products of collective activity rather than of single
components or dedicated control systems". Emergent structures require some complex
structure from which they can emerge in a manner that cannot be explained by a single
variable. They are beyond direct control and thus in contrast to designed structures.
Priss57Washington, DC, November 4,2001
This does not imply that in general WWW dynamics are more effective than term
occurrence or natural language dynamics. The success of a structure is context- and
purpose-dependent. According to Clark (1997), it is difficult to explain why structures
emerge and predict which structures emerge and thus even more difficult or impossible to
engineer emergent structures. In this case in the comparison between traditional engines
and Google, the effectiveness of Google's structures corresponds inversely to the
complexity of the underlying model. That means that the system (Google) that uses an
underlying model that is simpler (because a network is a mathematically simpler structure
than a vector space) is also more effective. Again it is not known whether that is a general
rule or just a coincidence.
In comparison to traditional search engines, Google uses a different framework for
emergent structures. Its primary retrieval and ranking algorithm is not based on Salton's
vector space model but instead directly exploits the WWW's network character, which is
represented by which and how many pages link to a page and by the context generated by
the anchor text of links. Thus although Google employs some algorithms for parsing and
other natural language processing techniques, it is not the dynamics of term occurrence
and natural language that is primarily responsible'for the emergent structures but instead
it is the dynamics of the WWW linkage structure itself that is responsible.
Yahool's hierarchy is entirely manually designed and has no room for emergent
structures at all. Search engines, such as Lycos, Altavista and Google, use emergent
structures because the outcome of a search is not explicitly stored in a database but
instead generated at the time of the search based on the parameters of the search. But
there is a fundamental difference between traditional search engines, such as Lycos and
Altavista, and Google. Traditional search engines are designed based on Salton's vector
space model of information retrieval with some additional models of natural language
processing, parsing, ranking and so on. The human involvement in creating these systems
is significantly smaller than in Yahoo! but the assumptions that are implicitly contained
in the model are quite complex. The emergent structures in these systems depend on
occurrence of terms in documents and on the dynamics of natural language because they
are highly affected by the polysemy and synonymy of natural language expressions.
Experienced users can successfully find information if they are aware of language
dynamics and formulate their queries accordingly (by using "and" and "or" to account for
polysemy and synonymy, respectively).
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2.2 Concept formation and definitions
Formal concepts on the other hand are more abstract and precisely defined. They are still
dependent on context but the context itself can be formally described. For example,
whether a tomato is a fruit or vegetable depends on whether the formal context is biology
or cooking. In a cooking context, vegetables can be formally defined as elements of the
main course. The tomato is thus a vegetable. In biology fruits are defined as containing
seeds. The tomato is thus a fruit. As mentioned before, mutual exclusivity is not required
as long as the definitions are precise but allow for overlap. This could, for example, be
achieved by using a faceted classification (Priss & Jacob, 1999).
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Many animals clearly distinguish between male and female members of their species,
between members and non-members of their species, between food and non-food and so
forth. No matter in what manner animals actually mentally perceive this information,
these are examples that can be modeled as associative or cognitive concepts. Clark (1997)
emphasizes that there is no clear distinction between cognition and the external world. He
states (p. 69) that "brain and world collaborate in ways that are richer and more clearly
driven by computational and informational needs than was previously suspected." The
following example illustrates that. The squirrels at my home have learned to beg for food
by jumping onto the window sill to get my attention. and then running to the door to
accept walnuts. But it is very difficult to feed them anywhere else in the garden. This can
be modeled as an associative concept of me as a food donor. But the concept includes the
environment where the activity is happening and ritualized behavior by the squirrels that
initiates the feeding activity. Associative concepts can thus be complex entities based on
activities and associations.
Emergent structures are a characteristic of associative approaches because formal
approaches contain rigid relations whereas the relations among associative concepts are
associative and thus open to flexibility and discovery. While Yahoo! is a manually
designed classification system, the WWW linkage structure that underlies Google is
flexible, dynamic and unpredictable. At the same time the WWW linkage structure is not
directly accessible to human analysis. There have been approaches to visualize the
WWW linkage structure (compare www.cybergeography.org) but such maps represent
associative structures and concepts, not formal concepts or classification structures. In a
sense, Google presents successful results but it is difficult to explain exactly why that is
the case. Again according to Clark that is typical for emergent structures.
To create a more transparent environment for users, a formal system could be added on
top of the emergent structures. Search engines, such as Northernlight, appear to do that to
some extent by providing an automatically generated folder hierarchy. To summarize, in
the case of search engines it has proven successful to start with an associative approach
(WWW structures) instead of a formal approach (Yahoo!'s classification scheme) but
that does not mean that users would not like to see a formal perspective (in the form of an
emerging classificationary structure) on top of the emergent structures. Formal and
associative approaches are thus not exclusive but instead may be combined with each
other in a multilevel approach.
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Formal definitions give rise to formal concepts with clearly defined extensions, i.e. sets
of objects which they denote, and clearly defined intensions, i.e. the formal properties
that are contained in the definitions. Formal concepts form an ISA hierarchy based on the
rule that the extensions of subconcepts are contained in the extensions of superconcepts
and the intensions of superconcepts are contained in the intensions of subconcepts. This
hierarchy can be a tree~hierarchy or a concept lattice (compare Ganter & Wille (1999a) or
Priss & Jacob (1999)).
Priss59Washington, DC, November 4, 2001
Humans can think of "flying" as a prototypical activity of birds even though not all birds
fly. If asked to define "bird", humans (at least in some cultures) produce a precise
definition which is appropriate to their current context and which could be "birds are
flying animals". If then prompted about a contradiction, such as "but not all birds fly",
there are two choices: it could either be concluded that concepts are fuzzy and cannot be
formally defined or the definition can be adjusted. In many cases the second choice
prevails. That means even though Wittgenstein~Rosch followers are correct in stating that
cognitive concepts are fuzzy, when prompted humans may abstract their cognitive
concepts into formal concepts. This process is so seamless that humans may not even be
aware of the difference between cognitive concepts and formal concepts as represented in
formal definitions. This is an acquired and culturally~influenced preference because
linguistic investigations (Iris et aI, 1988) demonstrate that there are cultural differences in
the degree of formality of concepts. Their study shows that the use of formal definitions
is more prevalent in cultures with written languages compared to cultures without a
tradition of writing.
The conclusion of this section is that both associative and formal concepts playa part in
human rationality and humans can shift between both seamlessly and unconsciously. The
differences between both types of concepts can be gradual. The shift from associative to
formal concepts is a form of abstraction because the intension of a concept is specified
(eg. "tomato ISA fruit"). A shift from a formal to an associative concept can occur, for
example, if a word that denotes a formal concept in some context is uttered and invokes
an associative concept in the mind of a listener. Any formal system can give rise to
emergent structures (i.e. associative concepts) if the system is too complex and dynamic
to be completely understood in terms of a fixed set of variables. Thus shifting the
Formal systems can be inconsistent, if there are contradictory definitions for items, and
incomplete, if relevant information about the classification of elements is missing. But if
a formal system is neither inconsistent nor incomplete, which can be achieved for fixed,
limited contexts within specific domains, then the concepts are neither fuzzy nor
prototypical as associative concepts are. This is because a formal system is an abstraction
and corresponds only more or less well to associative or cognitive concepts. In some
domains, such as the sciences, there exist large systems of formally defined concepts
which function reasonably well for their purposes. Rosch's and Wittgenstein's criticism
of the classical theory of concepts does thus not show that formal concepts are incorrect
but instead it shows that they are entirely different from associative concepts.
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2.3 Reasoning mechanisms and contexts
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Goldstone & Kersten (in press) state that "an extremely wide variety of cognitive acts can
be understood as categorizations". The formal equivalent to this statement is that formal
logic can be understood as an elaboration of formal concepts. This is because the logical
assertion that "a implies b" can be formulated as "there is a formal concept which has
property a and which is a subconcept of a formal concept which has property b". Ganter
& Wille (1999b) provide the mathematical details that show that any logical clause can
be represented as implication among attributes in a formal concept lattices. The
"cognitive acts" related to formal concepts are thus classification, logical inference and
causality. Associative concepts do not support these types of reasoning, which is why
formal logic may fail if applied to them. Instead the main cognitive acts related to
associative concepts are associations based on similarity, dissimilarity, co-occurrence and
so on.
To facilitate the integration of such multilevel approaches, clear representations of
"context" are required because both associative and formal concepts are context-
dependent. But the types of contexts are different. Formal contexts are abstract. Anything
formulated with respect to a formal context is valid globally in the whole context if the
formal system is consistent. Associative concepts are more detailed and "holistic" in that
they contain many possible associations of a concept. But these associations are not
globally valid. On an associative level (or in common sense arguments), contradictions
can occur as long as they relate to concepts in different associative contexts. It may be
acceptable to state that "birds fly" with respect to a local, associative context but not with
The two levels of formal and associative approaches are often complementary. Human
cognitive acts are usually neither solely associative nor formal but instead a combination
of both. The research by Chierchia et al. (1998) presents an example that supports this
idea. They investigate the use of logical AND, OR, and NOT. A commonly held belief is
that humans do not use these operators in the sense of formal logic. For example, if
someone is asked whether they want tea or coffee then "both" is an unacceptable answer
even though logical OR would allow this. Chierchia et al. point out, however, that in
hypothetical and future-related contexts humans do use logical OR in the formal logical
sense. For example, if someone bets $10 that it will rain or snow tomorrow, this person
will want to have the money even if it both rains and snows. There are thus some cases in
which humans use the logical operators in their formal logical sense. Whereas in other
situations the operators are overwritten by pragmatic rules that depend on the associations
of the context. "Both" is an unacceptable answer for present tense OR-questions not
because it is perceived to be illogical but because. its association is pragmatically
unacceptable in these situations. Humans easily shift between the different uses of logical
operators in natural language. They only encounter problems if the operators are to be
used in a strict formal sense in the context of search engines or programming languages
which is in contrast to conventional associations.
viewpoint on a system from formal to associative can provide new insights. This is
further elaborated in the section on dynamic interactions below.
'r'"'
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2.4 Symbolic and other levels ofrepresentation
Both associative and formal concepts can be symbolically represented. Symbolic
representations can thus be more or less formal. They can be quite informal, such as
ambiguous words with multiple meanings, medium formal, such as disambiguated words
in a specific context, and highly formal, such as scientific terminology which is
consistently defined for use in multiple contexts.
Priss61Washington, DC, November 4,2001
A fourth level to be considered is the external world. Independently of whether or in what
format an external world may exist, it should be obvious that this level matters. But as
Clark (1997) states, humans do not have a complete world model in their minds. That
implies that there also cannot be a complete world model represented in language. The
model that humans store in their minds is so incomplete that according to Clark it is
possible to add, alter or remove objects in a person's visual environment without the
person noticing it. The explanation is that the partial model that humans have in their
minds is continuously updated by perceptual input. It could be argued that since human
A system of symbols, such as a natural language, essentially represents another level of
representation in addition to associative and formal concepts. There are multiple and
complex interactions between the different levels. Linguistic phenomena, such as
polysemy, synonymy and lexical gaps (i.e. concepts that have a symbolic representation
in one language but not in another) indicate that there is no simple one-to-one
correspondence between linguistic units and concepts.
respect to a global, formal context of biology. There has been a substantial amount of
research in AI concerning contexts and shifting among contexts (compare Benerecetti et
al. (2000) for an overview). Examples of specific theories are CYC's micro-theories and
dimensions (CYC, 2001) and Devlin (1991) and other's situation theory. But these
theories are too focused on the formal side and mostly ignore associative concepts and
contexts.
Another difference between formal and associative approaches is their use of symbolic
representations. Examples of symbolic representations are natural or artificial languages
or symbol systems. Presumably a significant difference between humans and other
animals is the human use of symbolic representations. Experiments have shown that
some animals, such as gorillas, are capable of learning more than 1000 signs of the
American Sign Language (PBS, 2001). But that is only a fraction of the number of
symbols that humans can acquire. Thus animal cognition cannot be primarily symbolic in
the manner of human language-based cognition.
Devices that support human cognitive processes, such as search engines, classification
systems or programming languages, could be improved if they paid more attention to the
differences between associative and formal concepts. These systems should have some
flexibility to shift among representations. Both associative approaches and formal
approaches, such as formal logic and other well-defined mathematical structures, should
be employed by such systems.
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cognition involves both the external world and internal representations but language
represents, in this case, only internal representations, language cannot adequately
represent human cognition.
This poses a challenge for formal knowledge representation systems and formal
ontologies, such as CYC. Since these systems store symbolic information, it follows that
they can only represent a small proportion of the knowledge in question. CYC explicitly
stores information such as "you can see a person's nose but not normally a person's
heart" or "a normal face has two eyes and a nose". Humans do not need to permanently
store such information if it can be deduced from other knowledge and the external world.
In the face-example humans can look at a person present or evoke a mental image of a
person.
It is important to note that although words can evoke cognitive or formal concepts in a
human mind or represent such concepts in a specific context, in general, words are not
equivalent to concepts. Wittgenstein' s famous "game" example shows that the word
"game" without contextual information is ambiguous. It denotes a fuzzy notion of "game-
like". If "game" is uttered in a context, it is mapped to whatever fits best to being "game-
like". This also explains metaphoric and creative word use, such as in "game of life".
Since all words in a sentence have this incomplete indicative character, ambiguity is only
resolved by a combination of words within a context. If the combination of words is
sufficiently dense, some of the words become redundant. This redundancy ensures that
understanding is even possible if some words are missed because ,of noise or
unfamiliarity with them. For example, in "the XXX of chess", it might easily be guessed
that XXX can mean game. Associative or formal concepts are thus not directly
represented by individual words or phrases but instead they are associated with them in
context. Symbol perception causes cognitive concepts to emerge in the human mind.
Disambiguated symbolic representations are usually more associated with formal
concepts than with associative concepts because they are abstract and content-reduced.
For example, in "she looked through the window" and "she painted the window", the
word "window" refers in one case to the glass, in the other one to the frame. An
associative concept of window can have both associations. But a formal concept of
"window" would most likely either be in ISA relation to "transparent object" or to
"intransparent object" but not to both. Out of context, the word "window" can point to an
associative concept, but in the contexts of the two sentences it points to two different
formal concepts. Because humans know that one cannot look through paint, it is clear to
which formal concept of "window", the word refers in each sentence. But for a formal
ontology or for a natural language processing algorithm employed by a search engine, it
is difficult to disambiguate the two different senses of "window" because the system
would need to have access to knowledge about the external world.
As a solution, an ontology could store as much world knowledge in symbolic form as
possible. CYC does that. But even though more than 15 years of manual labor have been
invested into CYC so far, its representation of external world knowledge is still not
sufficiently complete. And because of the abstract nature of symbolic representations, it
~l
Priss 62
 
Priss, U. (2001). FACILITATING RETRIEVAL OF FICTION WORKS IN ONLINE CATALOGS. 12th ASIS SIG/CR Classification 
Research Workshop, 53-66. doi:10.7152/acro.v12i1.13793
ISSN: 2324-9773
Proceedings of the 12th ASIS&T SIGICR Classification Research Workshop
Clark also calls this a "mangrove effect" in analogy to the way mangroves create islands
by accumulating debris amongst their roots which in tum provides a substrate for the
3. DYNAMIC INTERACTIONS BETWEEN ASSOCIATIVE AND FORMAL
LEVELS
Priss63Washington, DC, November 4,2001
As mentioned before, the distinction between formal and associative systems is based on
a tendency of systems to have features of either one. But the distinction also depends on
point of view. For example, natural language can be viewed as an associative system in
that language use evokes cognitive concepts in the language user's mind. But language
can also be viewed as a formal system in that dictionaries provide definitions for
individual word senses that point to formal concepts.
An analogy for the shift or rise from an associative level to a formal level is a computer
game where players start at level 1 in an open structure and work their way up to a more
complete structure. Once that is accomplished, level 2 is reached, which sets the players
back to an open structure but on a more challenging level. A shift can start a snowball
effect or positive feedback loop. For example, Clark (1997, p. 62) speculates that in the
evolutionary development of humans "it may be that a small series of neuro-cognitive
differences make possible the origination and exploitation of simple linguistic and
cultural tools. From that point on, a kind of snowball effect (a positive feedback loop)
may take over.... It is as if our bootstraps themselves grew in length as a result of our
pulling on them". Devlin (2000) speculates on a similar effect of a sudden increase of
conceptual development in human evolution which coincides with a sudden increase in
human brain matter.
As another example, formal logic itself is obviously a formal system but it also gives rise
to emergent structures (or meta-level expressions) that cannot be explained within the
original system. Steels (1994) supports this view by stating that emergent phenomena
require description in a new vocabulary. Therefore associative concepts can even emerge
from a formal system such as formal logic. Godel' s work also provides evidence for this.
He proved that sophisticated mathematical structures, such as formal logic, are as a whole
either inconsistent or incomplete. That means they cannot be entirely explained and thus
have an associative character and give rise to emergent structures. Kuhn's (1962)
paradigms may have the same function: each paradigm starts as a formal system. But
viewed from an associative perspective some facts remain unexplained. A new paradigm
needs to be formed to explain the emergent structures from a prior paradigm.
probably never will be. A multilevel approach for ontologies would be to combine the
symbolic representation of knowledge that can be symbolically represented, such as "2+2
=4", with a more associative, schematic representation of knowledge that cannot easily
be symbolically represented. An ideal version of such an ontology would have a
robotic/perceptive interface that could directly interact with the physical world. But that
is quite futuristic. A simpler version would represent non-symbolic knowledge in 2- or 3-
dimensional schematic simulations, which would be mapped to associative concepts
using gestalt principles of perception. Given the modem achievements of robotics and
research in gestalt perception, such a system is not quite so futuristic.
 
Priss, U. (2001). FACILITATING RETRIEVAL OF FICTION WORKS IN ONLINE CATALOGS. 12th ASIS SIG/CR Classification 
Research Workshop, 53-66. doi:10.7152/acro.v12i1.13793
ISSN: 2324-9773
REFERENCES
4. CONCLUSION
64
Benerecetti, M.; Bouquet, P.; Ghidini C. (2000). Contextual Reasoning Distilled.
Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence, 12(3), p. 279-305.
Priss
I wish to thank Dr. Elin Jacob, John Old and the anonymous reviewers for their valuable
suggestions to improve this paper.
5. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Several disciplines favor either formal or associative systems and approaches. This paper
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claim is supported by the fact that the human mind combines both types of
representations. Such a combination often initiates a positive feedback loop because the
expressiveness of representations increases exponentially. Examples for this kind of
growth of expressibility are Kuhn's (1962) paradigm sh~fts and Clark's (1997) mangrove
effects. A conclusion is that once ontology researchers succeed in incorporating
associative structures into traditional formal ontologies, the representational capabilities
of ontologies may grow exponentially. This task is not easy but systems that implement
partial solutions (such as Ruiz & Srinivasan (1999)) already exist and several disciplines,
such as psychology, AI, and Data Mining can contribute to solutions.
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With respect to formal ontologies these feedback loops or mangrove effects have two
consequences: first, formal ontologies need to provide methods for multilevel
representational approaches, and for shifting among them, if the ontologies are expected
to reach the complexity of human cognition, emergent structures and the external world.
Second, the existence of feedback loops gives rise to the hope that perhaps all that is
required to boost formal ontologies is to understand how to integrate formal and
associative representations and how to initiate shifting. Once that is achieved the
feedback loop between both forms of representation may take off and grow exponentially
by itself. But, of course, reaching such an understanding may not be easy. Several
disciplines provide hints for solutions: cognitive psychology because it studies how
cognitive concepts are formed; several areas in AI and Artificial Life that study self-
organizing emergent behavior; Dynamical Systems Theory (compare Clark (1997)); and
last but not least Data Mining because it identifies associative concepts in large sets of
"raw" data.
development of new mangroves. Some mental tasks such as writing poetry or planning
activities are best tackled by alternating between a representation in the form of
associative concepts, such as brainstorming or imagining, and a formal representation,
which can even be external, such as writing or sketching the ideas on a piece of paper.
Similar examples of the mangrove effect are the use of diagrams as associative devices in
explaining mathematical facts or proofs, even though formal logic should be logically
sufficient for explanations; or maps used for navigation, even though algorithmic
descriptions, such as "tum right at the next comer", should be sufficient.
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